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The end of Ireland’s economic boom provides an opportunity critically to assess the 
nature of the state-civil society relationship as it has evolved, and to offer perspectives 
on how it might change in the immediate future. This is the purpose of this chapter. It 
begins by summarising what the book has told us about the nature of the relationship 
between state and civil society in Ireland as we put the Celtic Tiger period behind us. 
The chapter then illustrates some examples of the consequences of the type of state-
civil society relationship that became dominant in Ireland over the past two decades, 
identifying some worrying absences. The following section theorises the symbiotic 
relationship between state and civil society and how both have mutually constituted 
themselves with outcomes that are ever more evident throughout Irish society. The 
chapter finishes by mapping some alternatives about how the relationship could be 
transformed in a way that would be more beneficial for civil society and for Irish 
society more widely. 
 
The state-civil society relationship today 
Four themes emerge from the chapters of this book about how the state and civil 
society have interacted over the past two decades. These emerge from various authors 
but are consistent across the range of contributors to the book, thus reinforcing their 
weight. Each is treated in turn, drawing on previous chapters by way of illustration. 
 
i) A controlling relationship: 
 
In Chapter 3, Brian Harvey traces the evolution of the state-civil society relationship 
over the decades, drawing attention to the ‘many evolutions, changes of course, u-
turns, inconsistencies and adjustments’ that have characterised it. He refers to the 
promise of the first formal policy document on the role of civil society which finally 
appeared in 2000, endorsing the right of civil society organisations to have 
independence and freedom of action, and to be able to speak out on issues that 
concerned them. However, soon afterwards it became evident that policy was moving 
in the opposite direction, as a services paradigm began to dominate the role that the 
state envisaged for civil society. As Harvey puts it: ‘Increasingly, the relationship 
between the state and civil society came to be defined around services’ while, at the 
same time, organisations that received state funding – including those working on 
overseas development Travellers, and childcare – were told to cease criticising 
government if they wanted to continue receiving funding. Harvey offers evidence of 
an ever more restrictive and controlling regime being imposed on charitable 
organisations summed up in the sinister phrase ‘non-adversarial partnerships’ used by 
the National Economic and Social Council in 2005 . As he puts it, ‘that the Irish state 
fears a civil society that might dare try, in its words, to “persuade” speaks volumes of 
its multiple insecurities.’  
Comment: Page number 
In Chapter 4, Mary Murphy comments that the Irish state has retained and even 
increased its power over civil society and is ‘restructuring local civil society in its 
own interests’ rendering community work and local development work ‘vulnerable to 
the manipulations of the state’. She concludes that the Irish state’s strategy ‘to co-opt, 
control, disempower and attempt to effectively cognitively lock Irish civil society has 
been largely successful’. Martin Geoghegan and Fred Powell in Chapter 9 place this 
strategy in the context of ‘the hegemonic discourse of social partnership’ over the past 
two decades to which alternative approaches such as local development initiatives and 
civil society community action had to accommodate themselves. These authors 
therefore present the Irish state’s approach as just one approach and see local 
development initiatives and community action as alternatives to this.  
ii) Ever more disciplinary funding regimes: 
It is in the terrain of funding that this state control is most clearly exercised. Murphy 
identifies a politicisation of the funding regime for community and voluntary sector 
organisations and a discernible shift in funding to organisations that provide services. 
Furthermore, Harvey shows how the state’s desire to control the community and 
voluntary sector was first demonstrated in funding cutbacks and in unilateral changes 
to well-established funding arrangements, and he comments that the sector was ‘taken 
aback by the manner and vindictiveness’ of these actions. The growth in state funding 
for the community and voluntary sector over the past two decades and the ever greater 
dependence of the sector on such funding comes therefore at great cost to the sector 
and to the quality of Irish democracy. Also, it is becoming more and more evident that 
the state is using funding to impose its agenda in a very disciplinary way, a practice 
that makes a mockery of the ubiquitous discourse of ‘partnership’. Little partnership 
has been evident in the state’s decisions on funding for the sector over recent years. 
 
iii) State wants service provision model: 
 
For various contributors to this book, the thrust of the Irish state’s policy towards civil 
society is to move it from concerns with redistributive justice and social change 
towards the provision of services, usually in some kind of partnership with the state.  
Geoghegan and Powell describe the process as the ‘reinvention of community 
development as consumerist welfare provision rather than developmental active 
citizenship’. They conclude that the managerialist logic of social service provision 
orients active citizenship away from political activism and points it towards ‘more 
socially conservative conceptions of active citizenship that emphasise “self-reliance”’, 
thereby reasserting the pre-eminence of the state in the social partnership policy 
paradigm. 
 
For the practitioners of community development, this situation raises particular 
challenges. Catherine Murray and Paul Rogers write in Chapter 11 that funding is 
increasingly for service interventions and not for capacity building. They add that this 
approach to funding is ‘myopic in that it drip feeds funding into communities and 
ensures a dependency culture when we should be looking toward independence and 
long-term sustainability’. Furthermore they say they are ‘faced with the realisation 
that despite a significant commitment to social inclusion, there is little evidence that 
this commitment has become part of the dominant culture and ethos of many statutory 
bodies and other organisations working from a social inclusion remit’, something 
which finds expression in the ‘restrictive criteria of key programmes’. 
 
In his examination of a far wider set of social movements in Chapter 8, Mark Garavan 
interestingly identifies a fundamental range of issues to which the Irish state is deaf, 
that it does not want to hear from civil society. Examining controversies over 
incinerators such as at Poolbeg, electricity pylons such as those proposed for Meath, 
and the Corrib gas pipeline in Mayo, he writes: ‘It seems that lots of community 
actors seem to be very annoyed about lots of specific issues and well capable of 
expressing their disgruntlement.’ Yet, while these actors appear to have very little 
difficulty in articulating their position, Garavan argues that instead of being able to 
generate a deep debate on fundamental issues such as the meaning of development, 
the value of community or the purpose and implications of our economic models, 
‘they are instead forced onto far narrower discursive ground’. This he illustrates 
through examining the discourse between the various stakeholders in the Corrib gas 
dispute in north Mayo since 2000, concluding that in this conflict between community 
actors on the one side and the state and large multi-national corporations on the other, 
‘it becomes clear that critical issues animating the conflict are often not heard at all’.  
 
The state’s evident desire to restrict civil society actions to service provision is 
therefore doing a great disservice to Irish society as it drives into oppositional 
channels the rich contribution that civil society has to make to the fundamental 
questions facing Irish society, questions of justice, equality and models of 
development. Again this contradicts the rhetoric of partnership and shows a state that 
is unable to be self-critical and to engage in learning. It is a most ominous portent for 
the future as, due to the economic downturn, the state loses its ability to stifle dissent 
through throwing money at it. May it seek more repressive ways of doing this? 
 
iv) Blinkered and obfuscating ideology: 
 
In Chapter 6, Michael Cronin examines the meanings that lie behind the use of the 
concept of ‘active citizenship’ by the Irish state. Examining the deliberations of the 
Taskforce on Active Citizenship, he finds that what the term hides is any 
understanding of the unequal distribution of power in Irish society so that what is 
presented is a highly individualised and idealised picture of the power individuals 
have. Murphy makes a similar point when she writes of the failure of the state’s 
discourse on social capital to address power inequalities between communities. As 
Cronin puts it: ‘Such individualization of problems has the dual advantage of 
concealing the real power differentials between different players in society (“you have 
just as much responsibility as a Tony O’Reilly”) and making politics a continuation of 
market forces where what matters most is consumer preference and the sustainability 
of Brand Ireland.’ As a result, what the Taskforce presents are ‘sets of symptoms with 
no identifiable causes’ so that, by refusing to provide a critical context for the 
understanding of the operations of the market economy, it deals with problems it can 
neither understand nor resolve. ‘The result is that the active citizen is left to believe in 
a familiar credo of Faith (in the current politico-economic setup) and Good Works 
(volunteering).’ This illustrates well the blinkered and obfuscating nature of the 
benign rhetoric with which the Irish state has cloaked itself over the era of the Celtic 
Tiger – appearing to be friendly to citizens and their needs but neglecting entirely the 
situation of growing inequality in power and resources created by its policies, and 
actively discouraging any questioning of this situation by its citizens.  
 
Geoghegan and Powell elaborate on the implications of this ideology for the provision 
of services. Examining the treatment in the Taskforce report of three key issues –  
equality, political engagement, and governance – they identify a communitarian and 
neo-liberal view equating citizenship ‘with a voluntaristic, depoliticised notion of 
civil society based upon promoting social capital’. They add that the ‘relationship 
between the state and civil society in terms of governance is underpinned by a neo-
liberal managerialist view of social service provision’. They identify the key state 
concern that drives this ideological configuration as follows: 
 
What is emerging is a form of welfare where the ideology of neo-liberal and 
communitarian civil society, of community, eclipses the idea of a politically 
active civil society, binding social actors together in the name of the national 
project of ‘partnership’ i.e. of making Ireland attractive for international 
investment (emphasis in original).  
 
This identifies the Irish state’s real priorities and the reason why it limits the activities 
in which it wants to allow civil society to engage.  
 
In Chapter 5, John Baker maps out a more challenging agenda for Irish society, 
focusing on the issue of equality. He identifies that ‘the kinds of equality that have 
become central to Irish discourse and legislation are primarily the weakest forms of 
liberal egalitarianism – such as anti-discrimination legislation and means-tested 
support for basic needs – as distinct from stronger forms of liberal egalitarianism and 
radical ideals of equality of condition.’ From another angle, this again shows the 
limits of the Irish state’s view and, by making such limits transparent, helps to show 
just how restricted it is. As he writes: ‘Like many other political concepts, there are 
more and less challenging conceptions of equality, and it is generally the less 
challenging forms that have become familiar. However, the fact that equality is back 
on the political agenda provides an opportunity to press for more ambitious goals.’ 
This clearly opens up grounds for a more contestatory form of active citizenship 
promoting much more ambitious goals and putting pressure on the state to achieve 
them.  
 
Consequences and absences 
Some civil society organisations actively seek a new regulatory relationship with the 
state. Other civil society organisations struggle to maintain a wider and more political 
understanding of their role but are thwarted from doing so by the very regulatory 
framework that they seek to resist. There have been many practical manifestations of 
the loss of dynamism in civil society over recent years. The following discussion 
outlines a number of key ‘absences’ in the Irish state/society dynamic that, when 
combined, illustrate the scale of the task facing Irish civil society organisations that 
wish to reconstitute their relationship with the state. 
 
a) Absence of political dynamic  
 
Shriver (2007:64) argues that civil society is the natural counter weight to government 
in the affairs of the state and often the space from which spontaneous movements 
develop to oppose government policies. A review of the experience of the civil 
society movements in both Eastern Europe and Latin America illustrates that it is not 
unrealistic to see civil society movements give birth to new political movements. 
However, so far this has not happened in Ireland. There is recent Irish evidence of 
some civil society groups seeking to develop more overtly political strategies across 
environmental, service charge, regeneration and anti-development issues in local 
authority areas. This grassroots ‘ground up’ organising through umbrella groups like 
‘People before Profit’ represents a new space and a new strategy for Irish civil society 
and has already given rise to some new political dialogue. Whether it can be sustained 
over a long time period, and go on to develop broader political coalitions with anti-
poverty and equality sectors and other political actors, remains to be seen. 
  
b) Absence of national reform campaigns  
It was argued earlier that the present relationship between state and society can be 
understood as the outcome of  a long historical trajectory where civil society mirrored 
a state that is predominately populist in culture and clientelistic in forms of acting. 
Hardiman (1998:122) argues that if we want to understand the relative lack of 
progress in redressing inequalities we need a ‘closer analysis of the patterns of interest 
representation in the form of party policies and interest group formation’. Taking as 
an example that part of civil society concerned with social welfare issues, it is 
instructive to observe how it has organised itself not as a unified political force but 
mirroring the state’s social welfare categories – farmers, unemployed, lone parents, 
and those with a disability. Like the contingent nature of the social security system, 
the agenda of each civil society group tends to be one-dimensional. While some larger 
national organisations maintain a coherent institutional engagement with the state, 
most social welfare activity is focused on state-controlled processes, chief among 
them the annual pre- and post-budget ‘listening’ forums where up to 40 diverse and 
often small groups submit budget submissions. In this process it is commonly 
acknowledged that discourse is ‘voice without influence’ (Lister, 2004) that ‘has not 
proved enough to change policy priorities’ (Hardiman, 1998: 142). This sub-sector of 
civil society, because its organic development has mirrored the state’s own structures, 
has not the power of a well organised vested interest to influence policy. Similar 
observations can be made about the fragmented nature of lobbies in the health, 
disability, education and housing sectors1. This general absence of a national 
umbrella group dedicated to cross-sectoral campaigning on specific social policy 
issues is noticeable when compared to civil society practices in other countries.  
 
c) Absence of civil society as a positive voice in Lisbon referendum 
The experience of the 2008 Lisbon referendum campaign is instructive about the 
health of civil society and shows how a potentially beneficial and interdependent 
relationship between state and society can be diluted into a weak and dependant one. 
At least some of the discourse in the Lisbon referendum points to the presence of an 
active and independent civil society that was strong enough to provide an effective 
counter discourse to the established and mainstream body politic. There is also 
evidence, as suggested by new social movement theory, of a relatively healthy 
participatory democracy with the ecological movements and anti-military movements 
offering new and alternative ways of organising.  
                                                 
1 In the British context, both Whitley and Winyard (1987) and Lister (1988) observed the ease with 
which governments consciously play groups off against each other and the importance of members of 
the British anti-poverty sector acting as a single unified lobby.  
 
However, on closer inspection, it appears that the only civil society groups with active 
campaigning positions in the Lisbon referendum were those against the Treaty. These 
were groups independent of the state and without a structured relationship with it in 
terms of funding or service-delivery contracts. Conversely, civil society organisations 
dependant on state funding appeared not to want to, or felt unable, to participate 
directly in this key campaign. While some groups like EAPN Ireland and CORI led 
strong information campaigns2, generally civil society groups in structured policy or 
funding relationships with the state stayed silent on Lisbon.  This implies that some 
civil society organisations feel implicit or explicit restrictions on their freedom to take 
political positions in national debate. This reflects a tradition in Irish civil society 
where groups are careful not to align themselves to political parties, a tradition that 
McCashin (2002) relates back to the tendency of the populist Fianna Fáil to co-opt 
civil society.  
 
Contributors to this volume have argued that a legacy of Fianna Fáil’s hold on power 
over the last two decades has been an intensification of this historical tendency to 
depoliticise civil society. Since 2002 the state became more ambitious in this regard. 
This strong directive control of the state has arguably had the strongest impact over 
on that part of civil society most traditionally associated with the community and 
voluntary sector. Ironically these very groups may have had most positive exposure to 
the benefits of Europe (they directly benefited from EU funding, they have been 
exposed to European Union institutions and, through their membership of European 
networks, they express solidarity with other marginalised groups in the Union). Has 
the state depoliticised and silenced the very voices it might like most to hear from in a 
second referendum? It is healthier for democracy if civil society is contributing to 
debate from many perspectives and not only from the more extreme spectrums on 
both the left and the right.  
 
d) The absence of conflict in social partnership  
Over the Celtic Tiger period, social partnership processes have monopolised the 
context in which distributional debate has happened. Some credit social partnership as 
being the cause of Ireland’s more humane welfare trajectory, relative to the UK or the 
US.  Others argue that social partnership can, through co-option, limit protest and 
smother the potential for more radical change.   The period generally has been 
described as a missed opportunity when the state, despite enjoying the greatest 
resources ever, generally pursued a relatively inegalitarian fiscal policy. This 
highlights just how little influence social actors in many fora of social partnership 
have really had on key state policy.  Rather social partnership was used to establish 
and maintain an elite-driven consensus that failed to achieve a fair balance between 
goals of efficiency and equity in the Irish political economy.   
                                                 
2 The Irish European Anti-Poverty Network, with the support of the Communicating Europe Initiative 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, organised three regional meetings in Tallaght, Sligo and 
Tipperary, and a national roundtable on the social dimension of the Lisbon Treaty in May 2008. It 
published an EAPN Ireland ‘Review’ with articles from a broad range of contributors from all sides of 
the debate on various dimensions of the Treaty from a social perspective and placing it in the context of 
developing a social Europe. It also made a 22 page submission to the National Forum on Europe which 
highlighted the debate on the social implications of the Lisbon Treaty. CORI, a significant voice in 
Irish social debate,  also published  a briefing paper  and advised ‘we never recommend how people 
should cast their vote but we strongly believe that people should vote’.  
 
The elite-driven consensus was and is achieved  by working in institutional processes 
designed to generate and maintain consensus at the expense of processes that might 
generate conflict about distributional policy. This is done by maintaining a strong 
narrative of shared understanding where ‘social partners leave ideological differences 
outside the door and problem solve in the context of a shared understanding’(NESF 
1997) In this way the state, explicitly and implicitly, by controlling funding and 
filtering social partnership participation, mitigates dissent from such hegemonic 
shared understanding. Participation in social partnership offers special challenges to 
civil society organizations which understandably wish to maximise opportunities for 
‘voice with influence’ but also wish to avoid the smothering embrace of the state 
(Broderick, 2002). 
 
e) Absence of political debate 
Anne Marie Smith (1998: 7) argues that ‘political struggle does nevertheless depend 
in part on the ability to imagine alternative worlds’ It is not just through social 
partnership that the Irish state minimizes political  debate.  The state by way of 
funding strategies has helped create a monopoly role for some institutions in Irish 
discourse. ESRI analysis, for example, underpins social partnership (NESF and 
NESC) and anti-poverty institutions (Office for Social Inclusion). Kirby (2002) 
argues that ESRI analysis of  poverty and social inclusion is epistemologically rooted 
in classical economics theory. The dominant poverty debate concerns technical issues 
about work incentives and replacement ratios, definitions and measurement of 
unemployment, definitions and measurement of poverty/inequality and, most recently, 
labour market impacts of migration. This narrow policy discourse limits public debate 
and acts as a barrier to entry into the policy community. It is possible to identify an  
alternative discourse about rights, equality and social spending and a discourse 
promoting family values, parenting and responsibility but this is far less prominent. 
Again historical trajectories are important in understanding the present. The Catholic 
social  teaching  which focused, in the early years of the state, on more absolutist 
forms of poverty reduction and charity (Acheson et al., 2004) is directly correlated 
with modern political acceptance of ‘solidarity without equality’ (Ó Riain and 
O’Connell, 2000:39). The impact of a shift to more individual values associated with 
neo-liberalism has further eroded societal support for equality.  
The 2008 attempt to silence one of the most independent authoritative voices on 
poverty, the voice of the Combat Poverty Agency, is illustrative of how the state 
responds to any form of dissent from consensus on how to frame discourse on 
poverty. Combat Poverty has been a distinctive voice in Irish discourse promoting a 
wider and more humane discourse about poverty. Since 2002 the state has removed 
various functions from the Agency including its community development remit and 
its role funding of Anti Poverty Networks. The state has increasingly sought to 
control its public statements, requiring all press statements to be screened for veto by 
the Minister for Social and Family Affairs. Finally, in 2008, the Office for Social 
Exclusion established a seven-person review committee which, without due process 
and without considering alternative options, proposed to subsume the Combat Poverty 
Agency into the Department of Social and Family Affairs. This attempt happened 
when the poor were at their most vulnerable. Such a ‘reform’ of the Agency would 
make it part of a government  Department and directly lead to a significant  loss of its 
ability independently to identify and analyse the causes of poverty, comment 
independently and authoritatively on it,  objectively monitor and evaluate progress in 
tackling it and promote public awareness about it. It would also undermine the 
working relationship with community and voluntary sector groups working to tackle 
poverty. It therefore calls into question the principle of consultation with the poor 
which, according to the state’s rhetoric, lies at the heart of the Irish partnership 
approaches to anti-poverty policy. Since other alternatives were available to 
government (such as Combat Poverty Agency transferring to the National Economic 
and Social Development Office), it seems that the state is using the opportunity of 
reform of its agencies to weaken the equality, rights and anti-poverty agencies that 
have played a powerful watchdog role for the most poor and vulnerable in our society. 
State and civil society: a symbiotic relationship 
The contributors to this book have thrown light on how state-civil society 
relationships have evolved over the period of the Celtic Tiger. What emerges is a 
picture of a state ever more determined to use its power to constitute a role for civil 
society that makes it subservient to the state, providing services to some of the most 
needy in Irish society (often on completely inadequate budgets and lacking any long-
term security) but never daring to raise a critical voice about the glaring and 
scandalous injustices of that society, injustices it knows only too well from its daily 
activities. In doing this, its priority is to make Ireland safe for investment by 
multinational companies and to stifle any debate about the social impacts of the 
highly dependent model of development promoted by the Irish state.  
 
In elaborating this critique, this book can be said to adopt a civil society view of the 
state. Clearly, a book that drew on the views of state authorities towards civil society 
would offer very different perspectives and it would be a very valuable exercise to 
undertake. Yet, whichever perspective is adopted, it is important continuously to bear 
in mind that the state has the whip hand in this relationship due to its control of 
funding (and, of course, its far great ideological and coercive power). Clearly, as all 
the contributors have highlighted in different ways, the state exercises a lot of 
influence over the ways that civil society constitutes and organises itself, the goals it 
pursues and the means through which it pursues them. For example, in Chapter 3 
Brian Harvey reminds us of a much more empowering and contestatory form of civil 
society activity that emerged from the Irish state’s sponsoring of the National Pilot 
Schemes to Combat Poverty in the late 1970s, a programme that the state then killed 
off in the early 1980s when it got too uncomfortable with it. This reminds us of the 
power of the state in constituting civil society and the inadequacy of any view that 
sees civil society as a discrete entity that firstly constitutes itself and then afterwards 
establishes relationships with the state. Any reflection on the nature of Irish civil 
society, therefore, whether in the pre-independence period covered by Ó Broin and 
Kirby in Chapter 2, the period following independence as briefly surveyed by Harvey, 
or the Celtic Tiger period which is the principal focus of this book, cannot be 
understood without taking into account the ways in which the state helped constitute 
civil society. For example, it was the British colonial state that opened the spaces and 
even provided some of the organisational and funding possibilities that allowed a 
vibrant and creative civil society to flourish over the final decades of the 19th century 
and into the first decades of the 20th. It is paradoxical in the extreme, that a civil 
society activism that played such a key role in the emergence of an independence 
Irish state, should then be stifled and become highly dependent on that state for most 
of the 20th century. 
 
Making this point reminds us that the state-civil society relationship is not a one-way 
street. It is not only that the state helps constitute civil society but also that civil 
society helps constitute the sort of state that exists. Ó Broin and Kirby illustrate how 
this happened in the immediate pre-independence period but the same point can be 
made about the sort of Irish state that emerged and remained dominant up to the 
period of the early Celtic Tiger. Particularly following the arrival of Fianna Fáil to 
electoral dominance in 1932, the Irish state came to be characterised by its finely 
honed ability to co-opt potentially dissident elements (and where this was not possible 
to make life so difficult for them that they often emigrated) through piecemeal and 
often small-scale projects and spending. This may have ensured that a conservative 
civil society faced few challenges but it also meant the constitution of a state 
notoriously lacking in the capacity for longer term planning, reacting to problems as 
they emerged rather than developing the ability for proactive planning. Particularly 
since the economic liberalisation of the early 1960s, it has been a state that has been 
remarkably dependent on outside economic interests, again illustrating the weak 
development of the capacities of civil society and also the lack of sustained pressure 
from civil society to constitute a more activist state. As is widely recognised, the 
independent Irish state became populist in its culture and clientelist in its predominant 
forms of acting.  
 
Clearly civil society is not the only influence on constituting the state (outside 
influences such as multinational corporations or the EU, the legacies of history, and 
the nature of its own bureaucracy and political system also play major roles) but it is a 
major influence and it is difficult to explain the sort of state that emerged in Ireland in 
the 20th century without appreciating this point (see Adshead, Kirby and Millar, 
2008). For example, a more independent and critical civil society would have 
challenged the dominance of Irish politics by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and have 
pressurised the Irish state to develop a more coherent and integrated welfare state. 
Acknowledging that not only does the state help constitute civil society but also that 
civil society in turn helps constitute and change the state draws attention to the 
importance of civil society resisting the subservient relationship and role into which it 
is currently being pushed. For, without a more activist and challenging civil society, it 
is difficult to know what influences could help constitute a state capable and willing 
of addressing with some determination the huge challenges of equality and 
sustainability of which it has been so shamefully negligent. 
 
An analysis of contributions in this volume enables us to theorise further the 
state/civil society relationship at the end of the Celtic Tiger and make tentative 
conclusions about the health or otherwise of that relationship. We have argued that 
relative to the social transformation role played by civil society at the foundation of 
the state the relationship has been less political and mutually reciprocal and one that is 
more one-sided and dependant. It is also an increasingly market-oriented relationship. 
The value of civil society to the state has become one dimensional. The state’s interest 
in nurturing civil society is limited to a very narrow understanding of active, 
citizenship, namely volunteering and providing social services.  
 
 
Quo Vadis?  
Geoghegan and Powell (2007: 48) argue that there is potential for a renewed 
discourse about alternatives and for active citizenship to re-imagine itself as a 
democratic force. This section examines how this might be progressed. Is it possible 
to recreate the vibrant role civil society organisations played in the emergence of the 
Irish state (see Chapter 2)? What can be done to ensure political and policy 
alternatives emerge from civil society?  Acheson et al. (2004: 197) argue that to date 
the Irish state played a key role ‘in structuring the civic space in which voluntary 
action occurs’. When the institutional space in which civil society does its work is 
largely state controlled, meaningful distributional debate is limited (Acheson et al., 
2004). This begs the question of where and how civil society organisations position 
themselves in relation to the state. At least two things appear obvious. Firstly, civil 
society needs resources that are independent of the state. Secondly,  civil society 
needs to organise itself in free space that is designed for and by civil society.  
 
Taking the first question first, how to break free of being controlled by the state, the 
challenge is to break the historical trajectory described in these chapters and to 
struggle free from the cultural and ideological forces that have shaped Irish voluntary 
action and its development. Three strategies are required: organisation-level funding 
strategies, individual-level political activity, and strategies that give greater voice to 
the reality of poverty and inequality.  
 
a) Civil society organisations need to enhance their ability to resist the implicit 
and explicit threats to funding that do indeed occur when groups vocalise counter-
hegemonic discourse. Harvey’s paper in this volume and the contemporary debate 
about the Charities Act illustrates the real and serious problems facing organisations 
seeking alternative funding sources to those of the state. Recognising such strategies 
can be ‘frightening and unpredictable’, Ledwith (2005: 7) encourages groups to feel 
the fear and take up the challenge. The key here is what conditions will enable civil 
society actors and groups to take the level of risk required to break free of state-
controlled spaces and discourses. The question of solidarity is important as is Daly’s 
advice to work cross-sectorally, building links between largely separate spheres of 
civil society, for example trade unions, new social movements, political parties and 
community and voluntary groups (Daly, 2007). This requires actively listening to 
each other and denying the state space proactively to build divisions between different 
groups within civil society.   
 
b) The above comment is primarily about organisational decisions. However 
civil society organisations are managed by people, staff and volunteers, who are also 
citizens. As members of civil society each has their own individual relationship with 
the state, each votes, each can join a political party or take part in a protest march. If 
the challenge for civil society actors is to revive the very concept of active citizenship 
that the state is trying to bury, then there are personal as well as organisational 
challenges in doing this. The Irish state thrives on an apolitical civil society where 
many key actors go out of the way to demonstrate to the state their political neutrality. 
Taking up the challenge of radical participative democratic values means being open 
as staff, volunteers, residents and citizens to being politically active in civil society, 
with or without state funding. Despite the funding and institutional obstacles 
described earlier much can be done, not only as professional workers but also  
through voluntary political activity.  
 
c) Irish political culture promotes a non-ideological approach to political debate 
where political decisions about redistribution are reduced to technical statistical 
debates and where the dominant macro discourse revolves around competitiveness 
and employment growth. This discourse happens largely in exclusive spaces away 
from the public ear. A change in strategy is required to move debate outside closed 
policy forums or social partnership processes and into more public realms. These 
public realms could include more extensive use of media (such as newspaper letter 
writing campaigns or radio talk shows), and of local and national public meetings. 
The focus of such communication should be not technical debates but telling it like it 
is, voicing the reality of what it means to be poor or unequal in Ireland today and 
promoting the values that matter to civil society groups. This would result in a value-
led communicative discourse.  
 
The second question focused on how civil society can organise itself in some free 
space that is designed for and by civil society, how might it choose to restructure? 
Again three possible strategies emerge: rethinking social partnership strategies, 
organising in large cross-sectoral interest groups, and developing new political 
movements.  
   
a) If the present institutional shape of civil society, dominated as it is by social 
partnership, militates against articulating an effective political discourse, then what 
can be done about this?  Within civil society groups there are always tensions about 
strategy and whether to develop integrationist or conflict approaches to relationships 
with the state. A key debate in Irish civil society is whether or not to participate in 
social partnership. One way of approaching this debate is to avoid all or nothing 
choices of whether one should or should not participate. Rather, mindful of the 
tendency of social partnership to smother or silence political discourse, the question 
might be better rephrased when and for what purposes should one participate in 
partnership processes? Here we can distinguish the policy or problem-solving 
function of partnership from a more political function of partnership as a forum for 
redistributive political debate. Following Larragy (2001), redistributive political 
decisions in particular are better kept for the publicly accountable representative 
political system. This line of reasoning suggests civil society groups need to use 
social partnership sparingly and in particular avoid inappropriate use of the social 
partnership processes to develop policy that is more appropriately developed through 
public political dialogue and, when necessary, political conflict .  
 
b)  Given the sensitivity of the Irish Proportional Representation electoral system 
to well organised sectoral interests, the challenge for civil society groups is how they 
can organise into more pro-active long-term interest groups. For example, a national 
campaign for welfare reform could be built through a permanent coalition of the up to 
40 groups who have a recognised interest in social security reform. This could move 
from a strategy of ineffective short-term pre-budget submissions towards more 
individual, personal engagement between lobbyists and civil servants (Acheson et al., 
2004: 101). The sector was most influential when working through larger advocacy 
coalitions. The opposite is also true, when conflicting approaches were recognisable 
within the sector, governments manipulated the palpable differences as an excuse for 
doing nothing. Joint policy development work across organisations would maximise 
the sector’s power as a vested interest capable of influencing electoral outcomes.  
 
c)    What of civil society’s role in spawning political opposition and being the 
traditional birthplace of new political movements? Is there capacity in Ireland for civil 
society to develop a new left-oriented political movement or movements? There are 
emerging political spaces in Irish civil society. These include new social movements, 
new self-organised identity-based movements including new migrants movements 
and, as explored earlier, new alliances of previously unconnected groups such as 
‘People before Profit’. Some of these groups have formed alliances with academic 
and trade-union communities. The Irish social science academic community has 
formed an Irish Social Science Platform, a by-product of which may be an enhanced 
contribution to public debate (see Kirby, 2008). Existing groups like the Community 
Platform continue to develop strategies to work together. Tasc, a think tank for action 
of social change has made public its interest in making alliances and promoting 
political debate. The Labour Party has established a Commission for the 21st century, 
examining its relationships with civil society actors like trade unions and is open to 
transforming and renewing itself as a political movement. A number of NGOs 
working on international issues – Comhlámh, the Debt and Development Coalition 
Ireland, the Africa Centre and the Latin America Support Centre (LASC) – has 
founded a new global justice movement, Bloom. All of these different dynamics are 
to date unplanned and ad hoc and there is no clear direction emerging. However, one 
fact can be stated with certainty, there is a critical mass of people interested in and 
actively working for urgent social change.  Blyth (2002) and Hay (2004) argue that 
moments of transformation occur when critical junctures or opportunities arise and 
when people are organised sufficiently to impact on political debate and promote 
ideas that make sense in the context of that critical juncture. In the autumn of 2008, 
we saw emerging such a critical juncture in the global and national political economy. 
The opportunity is ripe for a new left social movement to rise to the challenge of 
being a natural counter weight to a political status quo that has generated such 
inequality, risk and vulnerability in people’s lives .  
 
Civil society organisations work best as the autonomous space between the market 
and the state. They influence the nature of political economy models and help ensure 
a better tradeoff between efficiency and equity considerations. While civil society 
actors often play a powerful role in organising a counter-discourse and influencing a 
state’s political dynamic, they are also an important partner for states in attempting to 
manage in an increasingly complex globalised world. The problem in Ireland is that 
the historical trajectory of a deeply controlling state has muted civil society’s capacity 
to be socially transformative. While this may have some short-term political 
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